

September 2022

**Communications Security, Reliability, and Interoperability Council VIII**

**Report on**

**Security Vulnerabilities in HTTP/2**

Drafted by

Working Group 1: 5G Signaling Protocols Security

Table of Contents

[1 Results in Brief 3](#_Toc113352806)

[1.1 Executive Summary 3](#_Toc113352807)

[2 Introduction 3](#_Toc113352808)

[2.1 CSRIC VIII Structure 4](#_Toc113352809)

[2.2 Working Group 1 Team Members 4](#_Toc113352810)

[3 References 6](#_Toc113352811)

[4 Objective, Scope, and Methodology 6](#_Toc113352812)

[4.1 Objective 6](#_Toc113352813)

[4.2 Scope 7](#_Toc113352814)

[4.3 Methodology 7](#_Toc113352815)

[4.4 Presentations from Subject Matter Experts 7](#_Toc113352816)

[5 Background and Related 5G Security Activities 8](#_Toc113352817)

[5.1 Use of HTTP/2 protocols in 3GPP systems 8](#_Toc113352818)

[5.2 3GPP Service Based Architecture (SBA) Overview 8](#_Toc113352819)

[5.3 3GPP Service Based Management Architecture Overview 9](#_Toc113352820)

[5.4 Standardization of HTTP and HTTPS in IETF 10](#_Toc113352821)

[5.5 HTTP/2 and HTTPS in 5G standards 11](#_Toc113352822)

[5.6 Non-Core Usage of HTTP (non-3GPP) 12](#_Toc113352823)

[6 Analysis of Protocol Vulnerabilities’ impact on 5G 12](#_Toc113352824)

[6.1 Analysis & Observations 12](#_Toc113352825)

[6.1.1 Client initiated attacks on servers 12](#_Toc113352826)

[6.1.2 Heist Attack 14](#_Toc113352827)

[6.1.3 Implementation Vulnerabilities 15](#_Toc113352828)

[6.2 Conclusions 15](#_Toc113352829)

[Appendix A: Enumerated Protocol Vulnerabilities 16](#_Toc113352830)

[Appendix B: Glossary of Acronyms 18](#_Toc113352831)

# Results in Brief

## Executive Summary

5G is the next generation of wireless networking, and is a complete departure from previous generations of networks. In previous generations, the next iteration built upon the previous architecture, while introducing some new functions into the architecture.

In 5G, the previous architectures have been eliminated, and a new architecture built on IT and cloud technology has been defined in its place. This new architecture is unlike anything the industry has dealt with before and introduces new attack vectors. One of those attack vectors is the Hypertext Transfer Protocol Version 2 (HTTP/2) protocol being used with JavaScript Object Notation (JSON) for signaling in the 5G network.

This departure from traditional technology and architectures is necessary in order to deliver the ultra-high speeds and bandwidth needed to support use cases with video and other real-time applications. Low latency requirements also required a change in the architecture to support more computing at the edge. These requirements are designed to support the connectivity of billions of “things” in our world, for use cases such as smart cities, industrial automation, TeleHealth, and connected vehicles.

CSRIC VIII Working Group 1 was tasked with identifying 5G signaling vulnerabilities associated with the HTTP/2 protocol specifically. The FCC asked CSRIC VIII, delegated to Working Group 1, to first provide a report on what vulnerabilities existed in HTTP/2 relevant to 5G, and second to report on mitigation and best practices for those vulnerabilities. The report herein is the first report dealing with protocol vulnerabilities.

It is important to note that while there may be many vulnerabilities identified in HTTP/2, these are all based on public access to the network (such as through the Internet) and not in a closed network as is the case with 5G. This was taken into consideration throughout our research. The report herein is the first report dealing with protocol vulnerabilities.

# Introduction

5G wireless and network technology is enabling a new wave of innovation that will impact many aspects of people’s lives from connected vehicles to healthcare and the internet of things. To meet this need, not only is it critical that 5G networks are highly capable and reliable, but it is also essential that they are highly secure, thereby ensuring the confidentiality and integrity of their intended use.

CSRIC VIII Working Group 1 (WG1) examined known 5G HTTP/2 Signaling protocol vulnerabilities based on existing industry sources, input from the FCC as well as presentations from subject matter experts. This report focuses on the analysis of the vulnerabilities as it relates to the security of 5G Signaling protocols and highlights key observations and conclusions. This report does not address mitigations. The corresponding mitigations for the vulnerabilities contained herein will be discussed in the subsequent report from CSRIC VIII that is due in June 2023.

## CSRIC VIII Structure

CSRIC VIII was established at the direction of the Chairwoman of the FCC in accordance with the provisions of the Federal Advisory Committee Act, 5 U.S.C. App. 2. The purpose of CSRIC VIII is to provide recommendations to the FCC regarding ways the FCC can strive for security, reliability, and interoperability of communications systems. CSRIC VIII’s recommendations will focus on a range of public safety and homeland security-related communications matters. The FCC created informal subcommittees under CSRIC VIII, known as working groups, to address specific tasks. These working groups must report their activities and recommendations to the Council as a whole, and the Council may only report these recommendations, as modified or ratified, as a whole, to the Chairwoman of the FCC.

|  |
| --- |
| **Communications Security, Reliability, and Interoperability Council (CSRIC) VIII** |
| **CSRIC VIII Working Groups** |
| Working Group 1: 5G Signaling Protocols Security | Working Group 2: Promoting Security, Reliability, and Interoperability of Open Radio Access Network Equipment | Working Group 3: Leveraging Virtualization Technology to Promote Secure, Reliable 5G Networks | Working Group 4: 911 Service over Wi-Fi  | Working Group 5: Managing Software & Cloud Services Supply Chain Security for Communications Infrastructure | Working Group 6: Leveraging Mobile Device Applications and Firmware to Enhance Wireless Emergency Alerts |
| Co-Chairs: Brian Daly, AT&TTravis Russell, Oracle | Co-Chairs: Mike Barnes, Mavenir George Woodward, RWA | Co-Chairs: Micaela Giuhat, MicrosoftJohn Roese, Dell | Co-Chairs: Mary Boyd, IntradoMark Reddish, APCO | Co-Chairs: Todd Gibson, T-Mobile Padma Sudarsan, VMWare  | Co-Chairs: Farrokh Khatibi, Qualcomm Francisco Sanchez, SBA |
| FCC Liaison:Ahmed Lahjouji | FCC Liaison:Zenji Nakazawa | FCC Liaison: Jeff Goldthorp | FCC Liaison: Rasoul Safavian | FCC Liaison: Saswat Misra | FCC Liaison: James Wiley |

Table 1 - Working Group Structure

## Working Group 1 Team Members

Working Group 1 consists of the members listed below.

|  |  |
| --- | --- |
| **Name** | **Company** |
| Brian K. Daly\* (Co-Chair) | AT&T Services Inc. |
| Travis Russell\* (Co-Chair) | Oracle Communications |
| Matt Carothers | Cox Communications |
| Martin Goldberg\* | National Security Agency |
| Angel Gomez | Verizon Communications |
| Stephen Hayes\* | Ericsson |
| Jithin Jagannath | ANDRO Computational Solutions |
| Antwane Johnson\* | Federal Emergency Management Agency |
| Ahmed Lahjouji | FCC |
| Xiaoyang Lee | Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security Agency |
| John Marinho | CTIA |
| Martin McGrath | Nokia |
| Maureen Mclaughlin\* | Satellite Industry Association |
| Danny McPherson\* | Verisign |
| Derek Peterson\* | Wireless Broadband Alliance |
| Mitch Rappard | Palo Alto Networks |
| Mike Recchione | Alliance for Telecommunications Industry Solutions |
| Greg Schumacher | T-Mobile |
| Amish Sharma | Mavenir |
| Christopher Wendt  | Somos |
| Michael Bergman  | Consumer Technology Association (CTA) |

Table 2 - List of Working Group Members

\* CSRIC Members

Sadly, John Kimmons passed away before the working group was able to publish its first report. John was a long-time contributor to CSRIC and his contributions were always much appreciated. We also had some attrition within the group as members moved to other working groups or left the CSRIC.

The Working Group members had an option to nominate an alternate to participate in the discussions when they were unavailable. Although these alternates are not a member of the Working Group and may not vote, they provided valuable input towards the completion of this report that should be acknowledged. Working Group 1 alternate members are listed in

Table 3.

|  |  |
| --- | --- |
| **Name** | **Company** |
| Adam Barron  | Verizon Communications |
| Martin Dolly | AT&T Services Inc. |
| Carroll Gray-Preston  | ATIS |
| Brandon Hinton | Satellite Industry Association |
| David Grossman | Consumer Technology Association (CTA) |
| Navin Jaffer | CISA |
| Young Kim  | Verisign Inc. |
| John Mattson | Ericsson |
| Mark Lucero | FEMA |
| Bradley Jackson | Verizon Wireless |

Table 3 - List of Working Group Alternate Members

# References

1. The 3GPP defined Service Based Management Architecture White Paper (Nokia Bell Labs) See: [The 3GPP-defined Service Based Management Architecture (nokianews.net)](https://nokianews.net/files/Nokia_Bell_Labs_The_3GPP-defined_Service_Based_Management_Architecture_White_Paper_EN.pdf)
2. 3GPP 28.533 Management and orchestration; Architecture framework See: [Specification # 28.532 (3gpp.org)](https://portal.3gpp.org/desktopmodules/Specifications/SpecificationDetails.aspx?specificationId=3427)

1. 3GPP TR 29.893 Study on IETF QUIC Transport for 5GC Service Based Interfaces
2. HTTP/2: In-depth analysis of the top four flaws of the next generation web protocol; Imperva, Hacker Intelligence Initiative; August 2016, V1
3. Signalling Security Analysis: Is HTTP/2 Secure in 5G Core Network?; Hu, Xinxin; Liu, Caixia; You, Wei; Zhao, Yu; National Digital Switching System Engineering & Technological Research Center; Zhengzhou China
4. HTTP/2: The Sequel is Always Worse; Kettle James
5. IETF RFC 7540; Hypertext Transfer Protocll Version 2 (HTTP/2); May 2015
6. 5G Network Slicing Security; McDaid, Cathal, AdaptiveMobile; Feb 2022
7. 3GPP TS 33.117 v17.0.0; Catalogue of general security assurance requirements
8. QUIC and HTTP/3; Ericsson presentation, April 2020

# Objective, Scope, and Methodology

## Objective

The FCC tasked CSRIC VIII to examine and address security vulnerabilities associated with the newly adopted 5G signaling protocol, Hypertext Transfer Protocol Version 2 (HTTP/2), which, like the SS7 and Diameter signaling protocols considered in earlier CSRICs, may be vulnerable to attacks. There is existing research where the HTTP/2 (and its predecessor HTTP/1.1) have vulnerabilities that put websites on the open Internet at risk. It is important to note that the vulnerabilities are applicable to networks on an open network accessible from the public Internet. They may or may not be applicable to closed networks such as 5G.

The task, delegated to WG1, is to research these vulnerabilities and identify others in a 5G context, assess their potential for harm, and recommend safeguards to harden 5G networks and protect critical business and consumer data from these and other cyber threats. The group will also provide recommendations in a later report on how to remediate the risks associated with HTTP/2 and prevent them from carrying over to HTTP/3, the next release of the protocol.

## Scope

The scope of this report is to consider specific and named vulnerabilities concerning HTTP/2 and applicability to 5G networks including the following vulnerabilities provided by the FCC:

* + slow read attacks, which call on a malicious client to read responses very slowly;
	+ HPACK Bombs, which are malicious archive files designed to crash the program or system reading them and often disable antivirus software;
	+ Dependency Cycle attacks, which exploit a new flow mechanism designed to optimize networks to instead create an infinite loop which cannot be escaped; and
	+ Stream Multiplexing Abuse, which uses security flaws in stream multiplexing functionality to crash servers, resulting in a denial of service to legitimate users.

The group will research these as well as other vulnerabilities and attack vectors identified by industry through industry SMEs and member expertise.

Consistent with previous CSRIC Reports for Signaling System 7 and Diameter protocols[[1]](#footnote-2), this report will focus on protocol vulnerabilities and related considerations and does not address specific implementations. This report also assumes use of previous recommendations from CSRIC 5G Reports.[[2]](#footnote-3)

## Methodology

The group will convene virtual meetings (initially biweekly) to:

* + Research/examine HTTP/2 security vulnerabilities and attack vectors,
	+ Engage SMEs to provide input to the group members regarding vulnerabilities, and
	+ Review initial set of vulnerabilities.

The group will provide its findings in two reports:

1. Report on Security Vulnerabilities in HTTP/2, due September 2022, and
2. Report on Best Practices to Mitigate Vulnerabilities in HTTP/2 and HTTP/3, due June 2023.

As part of the overall methodology, related JSON and QUIC protocols will be considered in the analysis of the second report as listed above.

## Presentations from Subject Matter Experts

WG1 received presentations from three sets of SMEs. These presentations covered research on HTTP vulnerabilities and work from the research community. The following SMEs presented their research:

* James Kettle, Portswigger
* Cathal McDaid, AdaptiveMobile
* Mirja Kuhlewind, Ericsson

The research efforts are ongoing and the working group members expressed their gratitude for the insights and information presented.

# Background and Related 5G Security Activities

## **Use of HTTP/2 protocols in 3GPP systems**

Prior to 5G, HTTP/2 was not specified to be used in 3GPP Standards based systems. These previous versions of networks used Signaling System 7 (SS7) (2G and 3G) and later the Diameter protocol (4G) for signaling. The 5G specifications from 3GPP specify HTTP/2 as the signaling protocol going forward. The two primary usages of HTTP/2 specified within 3GPP are for the Service Based Architecture (SBA) and the Service Based Management Architecture (SBMA).

In addition to the use of HTTP/2 specified by 3GPP, GSMA specifies the use of HTTP/2 for roaming between networks in its 5GS roaming guidelines[[3]](#footnote-4). These recommendations specify the use of Internet Packet Exchanges (IPXs) (which were also used in 3G and 4G) and the treatment of signaling in an IPX. GSMA is also specifying other HTTP/2 uses in the 5G network such as interfaces for [eSIM management](https://www.gsma.com/esim/resources/sgp-21-architecture-specification-v3-0/). Open-Radio Access Network (O-RAN) also specifies the use of HTTP/2 for orchestration and management interfaces in the RAN.

The 3GPP SA3 working group has identified a several security requirements for a 5G system (5GS). These security specifications are not directed specifically at the HTTP/2 protocol, but across the entire network. There are also a set of specifications for each of the network functions in a 5G network that may include HTTP/2 specific requirements.

## 3GPP Service Based Architecture (SBA) Overview

Prior to 5G, interfaces within the 3GPP system were primarily defined as point-to-point interfaces between functions. As the network became more dynamic with virtualization and increased numbers of functions, maintenance of point to point interfaces became unsustainable. For 5G, 3GPP adopted the Service Based Architecture (SBA). The SBA is specified in 3GPP TS 23.501[[4]](#footnote-5).



Figure 5.2- Routing Architecture using the Service Based Architecture from 3GPP TS 23.501 (SCP not shown for simplification purposes, please refer to 3GPP 33.501 Standard)

This architecture is composed of a multitude of network functions (NFs) that communicate over a common service based interface (SBI) message bus. Some of the key features of SBA are:

* Direct and Indirect communication and delegated discovery through service communication proxy (SCP).
* Introduction of network functions (NF) sets and NF Service sets – for 5GC the control plane functionality and common data repositories of a 5G network are delivered by way of a set of interconnected network functions, each with authorization to access each other’s services or sets of services.
* Selection and reselection within a NF set – the 5GC employs a centralized discovery selection framework that leverages a network repository function (NRF). The NRF maintains a record of available NF instances and their supported services. It allows other NF instances to subscribe and be notified of registrations from NF instances of a given type. The NRF supports service discovery, by receipt of discovery requests from NF instances and details which NF instances support specific services.
* Convert IMS interfaces to utilize SBA – The 5GC provides the mechanism to convert today’s IP multi-media sub-system (IMS) to use of an SBA that provides flexibility and scale in service delivery as well as support for new capabilities such as network slicing.

The protocol selected for SBI was REST using HTTP/2. HTTP/2 is the lowest version of the HTTP protocol allowed under SBA specifications.

## 3GPP Service Based Management Architecture Overview

Prior to 5G the management architecture was comprised of two management functions, namely an element manager and a network manager, with a reference point between them, labeled ltf-N, for which management interfaces were defined. Starting with 5G a new management architecture was introduced which moved away from the previous reference point based architecture and adopted a service based architecture, known as the service based management architecture (SBMA).

The SBMA is comprised of a set of management services (MnS) which produce and consume management services such as configuration, performance and fault management with additional services being added with new 3GPP releases. One notable difference between the SBMA and the SBA defined for the 5G Core is that for the most part SBMA services are not tied to a network function whereas with the SBA they are. For example, all 5G core network functions each have their own set of specific services that are strictly associated with a specific NF Type i.e. AMF has its own services, PCF has its own services and so on. The reason the SBMA adopted this approach was to provide as much flexibility as possible and hence encourage innovation such that vendors of management solutions could decide themselves what MnS’s their solutions incorporated without compromising multi-vendor interoperability as all MnS’s are standardized by 3GPP.



Figure 5.3: MnS Producer, Consumer & Management Function Overview

The SBMA defines a managed object model for each entity that it manages, which is referred to as a network resource model (NRM). For example NRM’s are defined for 5GC NFs such as AMF, for 5G RAN gNB’s and network slice entities such as network slice and network slice subnet instances, which enable management of configuration data as well as performance and fault management data. Services are invoked between MnS consumers and producers via a set of operations and notifications. More details are available about the 3GPP SBMA in the following white paper titled “The 3GPP defined Service Based Management Architecture White Paper (Nokia Bell Labs)”[[5]](#footnote-6).

## Standardization of HTTP and HTTPS in IETF

Hypertext Transfer Protocol (HTTP) is a set of standards allowing internet users to access and retrieve website information. There have been four HTTP iterations since its introduction in 1991. HTTP/2 was released in 2015 as a major revision and replacement for the HTTP/1.1 protocol. It was developed as a way to improve efficiency and online latency and speed. HTTP Secure (HTTPS) is the secure version of the HTTP protocol that uses TLS for encryption and authentication.

HTTP/2 is standardized in RFC 7540 and Hypertext Transfer Protocol Secure (HTTPS) is standardized in RFC 2818. HTTPS is optional to use with HTTP/2. When HTTP/2 is used with the HTTPS uniform resource identifier (URI) scheme it uses Transport Layer Security 1.2 (TLS 1.2) standardized in RFC 5246 or Transport Layer Security 1.3 (TLS 1.3) standardized in RFC 8446. If TLS 1.2 is used for HTTPS, HTTP/2 requires a very strictly profiled version of TLS 1.2. TLS 1.2 has numerous insecure options, including the mandatory to implement cipher suite, which HTTP/2 forbids. [IETF RFC 8740](https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/html/rfc8740) is a minor update to HTTP/2 that forbids TLS 1.3 post-handshake authentication.

HTTP/3 is the third major version of the Hypertext Transfer Protocol used to exchange information on the Internet. The TCP transport introduces latency issues within signaling and so Google has defined a new protocol called Quick UDP Internet Connections (QUIC) that emulates some of the session related features of the TCP protocol using the UDP protocol instead. UDP runs much faster than TCP sessions but is “best effort”. QUIC provides support for session related communications over the connection-less UDP protocol.

This has not yet been endorsed by 3GPP for use in 5G networks. There is still work underway in the IETF where the HTTP/3 and QUIC protocols are being defined, and 3GPP is waiting for completion of this work.

HTTP/2 allows an optional to implement clear text mode which enables trusted middle boxes to eavesdrop, modify, and inject HTTP requests and responses, it is not intended to be used for signaling in critical infrastructure like 5G. Optional security is nowadays not seen as acceptable and HTTP/3 mandates encryption and integrity protection based on TLS 1.3. Mandatory authentication, encryption, and integrity protection aligns with zero-trust principles.

## HTTP/2 and HTTPS in 5G standards

3GPP standards development relies on IETF internet standards[[6]](#footnote-7) for HTTP/2. Today, 3GPP has specified the use of HTTP/2 and while it awaits completion of the HTTP/3 standard. 3GPP specifies HTTP/2 in all the service based interfaces inside a mobile network as well as between security edge protection proxies (SEPPs) in different mobile networks (N32-c and N32-f interface), according to 3GPP TS 29.500 and TS 29.573. Security requirements for service based interfaces are specified in the 3GPP SA3 specification TS 33.501. All service based interfaces shall support the 3GPP TLS profile in clause 6.2 of TS 33.210. For 3GPP interfaces using TLS, TLS 1.3 is mandatory to support for network nodes since 3GPP Rel-15 and for devices since 3GPP Rel-16. Assuming all implementations follow the 3GPP standards, TLS 1.2 would never be used in the 5G architecture. Some early implementations of 5G network nodes do however only support TLS 1.2.

3GPP currently profiles IETF RFCs and is continuously updating 3GPP security specifications to align with IETF and to replace any obsoleted RFCs. There is currently no indication as to when the 3GPP will adopt the HTTP/3 protocol

## Non-Core Usage of HTTP (non-3GPP)

HTTP used for any 5G signaling functions should never be lower than HTTP/2. Uses of HTTP beyond signaling protocols in the 5GC is outside the scope of this report.

# Analysis of Protocol Vulnerabilities’ impact on 5G

HTTP/2 is used in in many different environments and to support many different applications, ranging from probably the most widespread and well known such as the World Wide Web, The Internet, and web browsing, to specialized and localized services such as micro-services. As described above, 5G's primary use of HTTP/2 is for SBA and SBMA as an example of a specialized and localized service, limited to operations within the 5G core network.

While it is possible to use the vulnerabilities researched by this CSRIC against any Internet connected entity from anywhere in the world, the 5GC is not connected to the open and public Internet. The 5GC is a closed network, accessible only from within its walls. It could be possible through an insider attack, but this would require the compromise of the network from within a company’s resources, and while possible, highly unlikely. Nonetheless, we will provide recommendations to counter such insider threats.

Therefore, the first assumption on approaching these vulnerabilities is that the 5G core network has deployed robust network perimeter defenses around the SBA and SBMA functions.

The second assumption is that these vulnerabilities would be second or subsequent stages in a multi-stage attack, where an earlier stage attack was a compromise of SBA or SBMA functions.

The results of applying these assumptions to the HTTP/2 protocol vulnerabilities described below means that some vulnerabilities may not be applicable or have limited impact to the specialized and localized use of HTTP/2 by 5G SBA and SBMA.

## Analysis & Observations

The earliest HTTP versions allowed by 3GPP specifications for the 5G SBMA and SBA architectures differ in that 5G SBMA may support HTTP/1.x and later whereas 5G SBA may support HTTP/2.x and later.

Recommendations for USA deployments will be made in the CSRIC VIII WG1 Phase 2 Report.

### Client initiated attacks on servers

These types of attacks enumerated in this section are initiated by HTTP/2 clients against HTTP/2 servers. In the 3GPP SBA terminology, this would be the equivalent of a SBA consumer (client) initiating an attack against a SBA producer (server).

#### Slow Read Attack

This vulnerability was specified as an example HTTP/2 vulnerability by the Commission’s initial CSRIC VIII Working Group 1 charter.

In a slow read attack, the malicious actor sends valid HTTP requests to a server, but reads responses very slowly, such as at one byte at a time. By keeping the connection active with these small reads, the attacker prevents the server from timing out the connection. The result is that the server must dedicate resources to each such malicious connection. Eventually the server resources may be overwhelmed or the number of slow read service requests being serviced simply blocks legitimate requests from getting through. This read behavior is not explicitly banned by RFC 7540 (HTTP/2).[[7]](#footnote-8)

#### HPACK Bombs

This vulnerability was specified as an example HTTP/2 vulnerability by the Commission’s initial CSRIC VIII Working Group 1 charter.

Dynamic header compression is introduced in HTTP/2. RFC 7540 permits the server (sender) to define the maximum size of the header compression table. However, the RFC does not restrict the size of individual headers. In the HPACK bomb attack, the malicious actor inserts a header field that is exactly the size of the HPACK dynamic header table into the dynamic header table, followed by repeated requests to expand that field in the dynamic table. These steps can quickly cause a small amount of request data to result in gigabyte-level storage requirements on the target machine. The result is a denial of service as the server’s available resources are exhausted.[[8]](#footnote-9)

#### Dependency Cycle Attacks

This vulnerability was specified as an example HTTP/2 vulnerability by the Commission’s initial CSRIC VIII Working Group 1 charter.

RFC 7540 allows a stream to be given an explicit dependency on another stream:

*“Each stream can be given an explicit dependency on another stream.*

 *Including a dependency expresses a preference to allocate resources*

 *to the identified stream rather than to the dependent stream.”*

This capability allows the server to prioritize stream handling. But the dependency graph must be a strict tree, as processing a loop or cycle in the graph can cause unpredictable behavior, such as infinite loops or resource overrun. The result is a denial of service as the server’s available resources are exhausted.[[9]](#footnote-10)

#### Stream Multiplexing Abuse

This vulnerability was specified as an example HTTP/2 vulnerability by the Commission’s initial CSRIC VIII Working Group 1 charter. On review by the working group, it is an implementation vulnerability; see Section 6.1.7 below for more information on implementation vulnerabilities. It is listed here for completeness.

An HTTP/2 stream represents a single request/response cycle. Once this cycle is closed, RFC 7540 requires that the stream identifier is not used again over the same connection. If an implementation fails to follow this RFC requirement, it presents an implementation vulnerability. The result is a denial of service attack.

#### URL Prefix Injection

The value of the scheme header is meant to be 'http' or 'https', but it supports arbitrary bytes. Some implementations use it to construct a URL, without performing any validation. This enables an attacker to override the path and, in some cases, poison the cache or create a Server Side Request Forgery (SSRF) vulnerability. Note that while the door is left open by the RFC, an implementation is susceptible if it lacks such validation; since the specific implementations are not know, this is considered a 'Protocol' level scope.

*“The value of the :scheme pseudo-header…is meant to be 'http' or 'https', but it supports arbitrary bytes. Some systems…used it to construct a URL, without performing any validation. This lets you override the path and, in some cases, poison the cache…”[[10]](#footnote-11)*

While this may at root be an implementation vulnerability (see below), it is included here for more thorough review and classification in the next stage of this effort.

#### SBA customer attack illustration

This sequence illustrates an example of how these SBA customer (client) DOS attacks could be directed against a SBA producer. As mentioned previously since the 5G SBA is a closed network and requires earlier steps to compromise the SBA consumer in this example. These earlier stages of the example attack are not detailed.

Step 1: Attacker compromises or takes control over a SMF instance (consumer) and is now “inside” the SBA.

Step 2: The compromised SMF mounts a SBA DOS attack against the UDM (producer) using the slow read vulnerability described above.

Step 3: The 5G network operations degrade under this UDM attack by the compromised SMF instance.

### Heist Attack

While the work on this vulnerability implicates HTTP/2 (RFC 7540), at root there is a weakness in other protocols and implementation behaviors. As the researchers report,

*“…because SSL/TLS does not hide the length of the clear-text message (a weakness that has been well-known to the security community since 1996) adversaries can directly infer the length of the response before encryption.”[[11]](#footnote-12)*

With this information, and by utilizing details of other protocols and web-browser behavior including handling of 3rd-party cookies, the researchers show the ability to extract encrypted information.

### Implementation Vulnerabilities

Along with the protocol vulnerabilities, there are a number of known vulnerabilities associated with incorrect processing of HTTP/2 traffic. Such issues may be due to failure to follow the protocol specifications correctly, failure to observe good cybersecurity practices such as input data validation, or simply errors in coding. These are typically classified as “bugs” in a product.

These implementation issues do not implicate HTTP/2 systems in general, as do protocol issues. Mitigation for implementation issues is a matter of upgrading to a version of the software provided by the product vendor that has a fix for the issue.

## Conclusions

The scope of this report is the analysis of the identified vulnerabilities relative to 5G HTTP/2 signaling protocols. The subsequent report will address recommended mitigations to address the vulnerabilities.

While use of HTTP/1.1 may be common, the known vulnerabilities associated with HTTP/1.1 suggest use of HTTP/2.0 or later versions of the standard is advisable for 5G Signaling applications.

# Appendix A: Enumerated Protocol Vulnerabilities

The information contained in the following table are examples of protocol vulnerabilities that are discussed in aggregate in Section 6. Analysis and mitigations will be addressed in the next working group report.

| **Vuln Name (& a.k.a.)** | **CVE or other ID** | **Overall Type** | **Description** |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |
| **Slow Read (HTTP/2 Flow Control)** | [**CVE-2016-1546**](https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2016-1546) | **DoS** | **Client requests a large amount of data but permits only a small amount (e.g. 1 byte) to be sent at a time. See also CVE-2019-9511, "Data Dribble".** |
| **Slow Read (HTTP/2 Flow Control)** | [**CVE-2020-9481**](https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2020-9481) | **DoS** | **Apache ATS 6.0.0 to 6.2.3, 7.0.0 to 7.1.9, and 8.0.0 to 8.0.6 is vulnerable to a HTTP/2 slow read attack.** |
| **HPACK Bomb** | [**CVE-2016-1544 (also CVE-2016-2525)**](https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2016-1544) | **DoS** | **Per the RFC, each peer can restrict the size of the dynamic header compression table, but does not provide any further restriction on the size of individual headers. Hence, the size of an individual header is only restricted by the scale of the dynamic table. The attack signals a very large dynamic table, then repeatedly opens new streams on the same connection.** |
| **HPACK Bomb** | [**CVE-2016-2525**](https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2016-2525) | **DoS** | **epan/dissectors/packet-http2.c in the HTTP/2 dissector in Wireshark 2.0.x before 2.0.2 does not limit the amount of header data, which allows remote attackers to cause a denial of service (memory consumption or application crash) via a crafted packet.** |
| **HPACK Bomb** | [**CVE-2016-6581**](https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2016-6581) | **DoS** | **A HTTP/2 implementation built using any version of the Python HPACK library between v1.0.0 and v2.2.0 could be targeted for a denial of service attack, specifically a so-called "HPACK Bomb" attack. This attack occurs when an attacker inserts a header field that is exactly the size of the HPACK dynamic header table into the dynamic header table. The attacker can then send a header block that is simply repeated requests to expand that field in the dynamic table. This can lead to a gigantic compression ratio of 4,096 or better, meaning that 16kB of data can decompress to 64MB of data on the target machine.** |
| **HPACK Bomb** | [**CVE-2018-5530**](https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2018-5530) | **DoS** | **F5 BIG-IP 13.0.0-13.1.0.5, 12.1.0-12.1.3.5, or 11.6.0-11.6.3.1 virtual servers with HTTP/2 profiles enabled are vulnerable to "HPACK Bomb".** |
| **Dependency Cycle Attack (Dependency and Priority)** | [**CVE-2015-8659**](https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2015-8659) | **Unspecified Impact** | **Per the RFC, a stream may be given an explicit dependency on another stream; this aids in prioritization of stream processing. The dependency graph must be a tree as a cycle in this graph may cause infinite loops or memory overruns (Dependency Cycle Attack). The size of the graph is not limited by the RFC so each server can set its size limitation. The idle stream handling in nghttp2 before 1.6.0 allows attackers to have unspecified impact via unknown vectors, aka a heap-use-after-free bug.** |
|  **Data Dribble** | [**CVE-2019-9511**](https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2019-9511) | **DoS** | **The attacker requests a large amount of data from a specified resource over multiple streams. They manipulate window size and stream priority to force the server to queue the data in 1-byte chunks. Depending on how efficiently this data is queued, this can consume excess CPU, memory, or both, potentially leading to a denial of service.** |
| **URL Prefix Injection** | **N/A** | **Unspecified Impact** | **The value of the scheme header is meant to be 'http' or 'https', but it supports arbitrary bytes. Some system use it to construct a URL, without performing any validation. This lets you override the path and, in some cases, poison the cache or creating a Server Side Request Forgery (SSRF) vulnerability. Note that while the door is left open by the RFC, an implementation is susceptible if it lacks of validation; since the specific implementations are not know, this is considered a 'Protocol' level scope.**  |
| **HEIST Attack** | [**CVE-2016-7153**](https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2016-7153) | **Data Exfiltration** | **The HTTP/2 protocol does not consider the role of the TCP congestion window in providing information about content length, which makes it easier for remote attackers to obtain cleartext data by leveraging a web-browser configuration in which third-party cookies are sent, aka a "HEIST" attack.** |

# Appendix B: Glossary of Acronyms

3GPP 3rd Generation Partnership Project

4G Fourth Generation

5G Fifth generation

5GC 5G core

5GS 5G System

AF Application function

AMF Access and mobility function

AN Access Network

API Application Programming Interface

AS Access Stratum

ATIS Alliance for Telecommunications Industry Solutions

AUSF Authentication server function

BGP Border gateway protocol

BITAG Broadband Internet Technical Advisory Group

BSS Base station subsystem

CIoT Cellular Internet of Things

CMMC Cybersecurity Maturity Model Cybersecurity

CP Control Plane

CSA Cloud Security Alliance

CSCC Communications Sector Coordinating Council

CSRIC Communications Security, Reliability and Interoperability Council

CTIA CTIA – The Wireless Association

CU Central unit

DDoS Distributed denial of service

DHS Department of Homeland Security

DU Distributed units

eSIM electronic Subscription Identity Module

ETSI European Telecommunications Standards Institute

FCC Federal Communications Commission

gNB generation Node B

GSMA Global System for Mobile Communications Association

GTP GPRA Tunneling Protocol

HPACK Dynamic Header Packing

HTTP Hypertext Transfer Protocol

ICT Information and Communications Technology

IEEE Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers

IETF Internet Engineering Task Force

IMSI International Mobile Subscriber Identity

IoT Internet of Things

IP Internet protocol

IPX Internet Packet Exchange

IPSec Internet Protocol Security

ISP Internet service providers

IT Information technology

ITU International Telecommunication Union

LTE Long-term evolution

MnS Management Services

NEF Network exposure function

NF Network functions

NFV Network function virtualization

NGC Next generation core

NGMN Next Generation Mobile Network

NG-RAN Next generation radio access network

NH Next Hop

NIST National Institute of Standards and Technology

NR New Radio

NPRM Notice of Proposed Rulemaking

NRF Network resource function

NRM Network Resource Model

NSA Non-standalone

NSSAI Network Slice Selection Assistance Information

NSSF Network slice selection function

PBCH Physical broadcast channel

PCF Policy control function

PCFICH Physical control format indicator channel

PCI Physical cell identity

PCRF Policy and charging rules function

PGW Packet gateway

PLMN Public Land Mobile Network

QUIC Quick UDP Internet Connections

RAN Radio Access Network

SA Standalone

SA3 Security working group

SAE System Architecture Evolution

SBA Service-based architecture

SBMA Services Based Management Architecture

SEPP Secure Edge Protection Proxy

SS7 Signaling system 7

SSB Synchronization signal block

SSS Secondary synchronization signal

SST Slice/Service type

SUPI Subscription Permanent Identifier

TAU Tracking Area Update

TLS Transport Layer Security

TS Technical Specification

UDM Unified data management

UE User equipment

UMTS Universal Mobile Telecommunications System

UPF User plane function

URL Uniform Resource Locator

URLLC Ultra-reliable low-latency communication

URI Uniform Resource Identifier

VLR Visitor location register

 WG Working Group

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