



# Working Group 1: Harnessing Artificial Intelligence/Machine Learning to Ensure the Security, Reliability, and Integrity of the Nation's Communications Networks


December 18, 2024

Co-Chairs: Vijay K. Gurbani, Vail Systems  
Jason Hogg, Microsoft


FCC Liaison: Zenji Nakazawa

# Working Group 1 : Background

**Fundamental question:** How does AI/ML affect the security and reliability of communications networks and how to mitigate the challenges that the technology poses?



Source: <https://5g.systemsapproach.org/>




**The Challenge(s)**

- Communications networks are complex
- AI / ML are being applied across the network
- Different types of AI / ML models
- Rapid rate of development
- How to identify and prioritize relevant threats?
- ... without boiling the ocean!



# Working Group 1 : Background



Sources of complexity:

1. The technology (AI/ML)
2. The telecommunications network
3. Securing AI/ML

# Working Group 1: Members

## Co-chairs:

Vijay Gurbani, *Vail Systems*

Jason Hogg, *Microsoft*

Mark D Annas, *City of Riverside, CA*

Praveen Atreya, *Verizon*

Mike Barnes, *Mavenir Systems*

Richard Barron, *The MITRE Corporation*

Chris Bennett, *Motorola Solutions*

Craig Bowman, *Futuri*

Matt Carothers, *Cox Communications*

Christina Chaccour, *Ericsson*

Andrew L Drozd, *ANDRO Computational Solutions*

Luiz Eduardo, *Hewlett-Packard Enterprise*

Bob Everson, *Cisco Systems*

Ben Goldsmith, *DOJ*

Mark Grubb, *CISA*

Ankur Kapoor, *T-Mobile*

Yong Kim, *VeriSign*

Lauren Kravetz, *Intrado Life & Safety*

Salman Marvasti, *Advanced Computer Concepts*

Tim May, *NTIA*

Martin McGrath, *Nokia*

Brian Murray, *Harris County, TX*

Jonathan Petit, *Qualcomm*

Abir Ray, *Expression Networks*

Travis Reutter, *ACA Connects*

Travis Russell, *Oracle Communications*

Peter Santhanam, *IBM*

Narothum Saxena, *UScellular*

Peter Scott, *Public Broadcasting Service*

Rikin Thakker, *NCTA*

David Valdez, *CTIA*

Henry Young, *BSA | The Software Alliance*

Dongsong Zeng, *U.S. Department of Commerce*



# Working Group 1: Alternates\*

Anmol Agarwal, *Nokia*

Patrick Arsenault, *Intrado Life & Safety, Inc*

Michael Beirne, *CTIA*

Robert Cantu, *NCTA*

Devin Christensen, *CISA*

Sean Donelan, *VeriSign, Inc.*

Narayanan (Nars) Haran, *UScellular*

John Hunter, *T-Mobile*

Jithin Jagannath, *ANDRO Computational Solutions, LLC*

Olga Medina, *BSA | The Software Alliance*

Jennifer L Oberhausen, *Microsoft*

Jim Reno, *Ericsson*

Joseph Smetana, *Vail Systems, Inc.*

Kamakshi Sridhar, *Mavenir Systems, Inc.*

Mourad Takla, *Verizon*

Bill Tortoriello, *ACA Connects*

Lei Yu, *Expression Networks LLC*

\* Alternates are not a member of the Working Group and may not vote.




## Update since Sep 2024

- 33 members
- 15 alternates
- Weekly meetings after WG was vetted, first one on Oct-03
- 1 interim meeting – Dec-10
- Editor team identified for the first deliverable
- Work is divided into 13 *Technical Areas*

# Technology Area Teams

Area	Lead	Members
UE Handset	Salman Marvasti	Jonathan Petit
Audio + Speech	Luiz Eduardo	Jonathan Petit, Craig Bowman
UE IoT	Bob Everson	Dongsong Zeng, David Valdez
Business Support Systems	Peter Santhanam	Travis Russell, Travis Reuter
Contact center operations	Peter Santhanam	Travis Russell, Travis Reuter
5G OSS	Praveen Atreya	Abir Ray, Travis Russell, Yong Kim, Henry Young
5G RAN	Abir Ray	Andrew Drozd, Mike Barnes, Christina Chaccour, Martin McGrath, Richard Baron
5G Backhaul	Bob Everson (?)	Rob Cantu, Rikin Thakker, Dongsong Zeng
5G Core	Timothy May	Narothum Saxena, Travis Reutter, Mike Barnes, Christina Chaccour, Martin McGrath, Bob Everson, Praveen Atreya, Travis Russell
Network Interconnection	Luiz Eduardo	Salman Marvasti, Travis Reutter, Travis Russell
Wireline Networks	Robert Cantu	Rikin Thakker, Travis Russell
6G Networks	Andy Drozd	Christina Chaccour, Martin McGrath, Travis Russell
Public safety networks	Mark Grubb (?)	Mark Annas, Devin Christensen, Brian Murray, Chris Bennett, Craig Bowman, Peter Scott, Patrick Arsenault, Rob Cantu, Rikin Thakker



Threats for consumers

Threats in deployed networks

Threats in emerging networks

Threats in NG911/Public Safety networks

# Technology Area Work Plan

- Each TA is headed by a lead
- Goal of TAs
  - First order goal: Investigate the use of AI/ML in that area and arrive at a set of scenarios to document the risks of AI/ML.
  - High order goal: Take 2-3 scenarios that are representative of the use and risks posed by AI/ML for a further critical analysis.
- The higher-order goal feeds into the first deliverable as recommendations.



# High-level Schedule

Target Date	Goal
October 3	Identify Core Technology Focus Areas and Conduct Research
October 31	Develop Report Outline
Nov 1 – Nov 30	Assay Key Technology Area Functions and AI/ML Scenarios
December 13	Build and Fine Tune AI/ML Use Case Portfolios Across Technology Focus Areas
Dec 16 – Jan 14	Deep Analysis of Use Cases and First Draft Writing Period
January 15	Submit First Drafts of Technology Area Segments
Jan 16 – Jan 31	Coalesce Threats and Recommendations
February 7	Complete First Draft - Pens Down
February 26	Final Draft Delivered to DFO Cameron
March 5	Final Draft Transmitted to Council by DFO Cameron
March 19	CSRIC IX Meeting – Report Presentation to Council for Deliberation and Vote

# Detailed Team Update

Area	Lead	Members	Scenarios Created (PPT)	Scenarios Peer Reviewed	Detailed Content (Word)	Detail Content Peer Reviewed
UE Handset	Salman Marvasti	Jonathan Petit	12/10/2024	12/12/2024	1/1/2025	1/15/2025
Audio + Speech	Luiz Eduardo	Jonathan Petit, Craig Bowman	COMPLETE			1/15/2025
UE IoT	Bob Everson	Dongsong Zeng, David Valdez	12/13/2024			1/11/2025
Business Support Systems	Peter Santhanam	Travis Russell, Travis Reuter				1/15/2025
Contact center operations	Peter Santhanam	Travis Russell, Travis Reuter				1/15/2025
5G OSS	Praveen Atreya	Abir Ray, Travis Russell, Yong Kim, Henry Young				1/15/2025
5G RAN	Abir Ray	Andrew Drozd, Mike Barnes, Christina Chaccour, Martin McGrath, Richard Baron				1/15/2025
5G Backhaul	Bob Everson	Rob Cantu, Rikin Thakker, Dongsong Zeng				1/15/2025
5G Core	Timothy May	Narothum Saxena, Travis Reutter, Mike Barnes, Christina Chaccour, Martin McGrath, Bob Everson, Praveen Atreya, Travis Russell	12/13/24	By 12/20/24	By 1/8/25	1/15/2025
Network Interconnection	Luiz Eduardo	Salman Marvasti, Travis Reutter, Travis Russell				1/15/2025
Wireline Networks	Robert Cantu	Rikin Thakker, Travis Russell				1/15/2025
6G Networks	Andy Drozd	Christina Chaccour, Martin McGrath, Travis Russell				1/15/2025
Public safety networks	Mark Grubb (?)	Mark Annas, Devin Christensen, Brian Murray, Chris Bennett, Craig Bowman, Peter Scott, Patrick Arseneault, Rob Cantu, Rikin Thakker				1/15/2025

# Example Analysis (1): RAN Energy Savings

No	Use case	What is the AI doing?	What is the threat?	How to mitigate?
1	Energy Saving	<p>Energy Efficiency (EE) system in RAN optimizes power consumption across network elements while maintaining Quality of Service (QoS).</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Collects real-time traffic patterns and network performance metrics</li> <li>Predicts traffic loads and required capacity</li> <li>Dynamically adjusts power states of radio elements</li> <li>Controls sleep modes and carrier shutdowns</li> <li>Manages multiple-input multiple-output (MIMO) configurations</li> </ul>	<p>a) Data Poisoning Attacks</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Adversaries could inject manipulated traffic pattern data during model training</li> <li>Impact: Models could make incorrect predictions leading to: <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Unnecessary power-downs during high traffic periods</li> <li>Excessive power consumption during low-demand periods</li> <li>Service disruptions due to misconfigured sleep modes</li> </ul> </li> </ul> <p>b) Model Evasion Attacks</p> <p>Attackers might craft adversarial inputs to fool the traffic prediction models</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Example: Injecting specific traffic patterns that trigger unnecessary power-saving modes</li> <li>Impact: Service degradation in specific geographic areas</li> <li>Increased power consumption due to frequent mode switching</li> <li>Customer experience deterioration</li> </ul>	<p>Mitigation Strategies</p> <p>a) Data Protection</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Implement robust validation for training data sources</li> <li>Deploy anomaly detection for real-time telemetry</li> </ul> <p>Establish data integrity checks for historical records</p> <p>b) Model Security</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Regular retraining with validated data sets</li> <li>Implementation of model validation frameworks</li> </ul> <p>Monitoring of model prediction patterns for anomalies</p> <p>c) Operational Controls</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Rate limiting on power state changes</li> <li>Multi-factor validation for significant configuration changes</li> </ul> <p>Geographic correlation checks for power optimization decisions</p> <p>d) Architectural Safeguards</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Distributed model deployment with local validation</li> <li>Hierarchical decision-making with oversight</li> <li>Fallback mechanisms for suspicious behavior</li> </ul>

# Example Analysis (2): BSS

No	Use case	What is the AI doing?	What is the risk?	How to mitigate?
5 (TM Forum)	Lead Generation for Enterprise Markets: Enhances the ability of sales teams to identify high-potential leads, particularly in the SME sector, driving revenue growth.	<i>GenAI application</i> Analyzes market data and customer behavior to provide actionable sales insights.	The system may produce wrong recommendations.	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Quantify the system performance with proper benchmarks.</li> <li>Make sure proper trust attributes (e.g. source attribution and explainability, etc.) are produced with the recommendation.</li> <li>Include learning mechanisms to improve the performance over time.</li> </ul>
6 (TM Forum)	Publishing BSS Knowledge for Business Users: Facilitates access to relevant business information, enhancing decision-making and operational efficiency.	<i>GenAI application.</i> Synthesize and publish BSS knowledge for business users.	The system may produce wrong/inappropriate information.	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Quantify the system performance with proper benchmarks.</li> <li>Make sure proper trust attributes (e.g. source attribution, explainability, etc.) are produced with the recommendation.</li> <li>Include learning mechanisms to improve the performance over time.</li> </ul>
7 (TM Forum)	Intelligent Field Operation Assistance: Optimizes field operations, reducing costs and improving service delivery through quicker fault detection and resolution.	<i>Agents based Mixture of Experts AI application.</i> Provides real-time support and decision-making tools for field maintenance engineers (FMEs), enhancing operational efficiency.	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Complex application needing significant investment</li> <li>The system may produce wrong recommendations.</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Quantify the system performance with proper benchmarks.</li> <li>Make sure proper trust attributes (e.g. source attribution, explainability, etc.) are produced with the recommendation.</li> <li>Include learning mechanisms to improve the performance over time.</li> </ul>

# Discussion / Feedback

Thank you!





# **Working Group # 2: Ensuring Consumer Access to 911 on All Available Networks As Technology Evolves**

December 18, 2024

Co-Chairs: Brandon Abley, Stephen Hayes

FCC Liaison: Gerald English, Ryan Hedgpeth

# Deliverables/Schedule

- We have the following milestones:
  1. Report on Recommendations and Best Practices for Connecting Stalled 911 Calls Through Alternative Network Options, **June 2025**
    - Identifying, prioritizing and quickly connecting 911 calls via alternative network options;
    - Reducing latency when utilizing alternative network options and for ameliorating the impact of any significant latency that cannot be avoided;
    - Reducing, or eliminating, any technical limitations currently in place for any, or all, alternate network options.
  2. Report on Recommendations for Preventing Adverse Impacts on PSAPs and NG911 from 911 Calls Made Through Alternative Network Options, **March 2026**
    - Providing PSAPs with actionable, accurate, information, including caller location and source (call type) of call when alternative network options are selected and utilized; and
    - Addressing any impacts, positive or negative, that these alternative network options might have on NG911.



# Working Group 2 : Members

Brandon Abley: NENA (Co-chair)

Stephen Hayes: Ericsson (Co-chair)

- Rob Alderfer: Charter Communications
- Jeffrey Bratcher: FirstNet
- Wade Buckner: International Association of Fire Chiefs
- Kirk Burroughs: Apple Inc.
- Victor Burton: Comtech Telecommunications Corp.
- Douglas Campbell: Metropolitan Washington Airports Authority
- Stephen Devine: APCO International
- Stephen Edge: Qualcomm Incorporated
- Craig Fugate: America's Public Television Stations (APTS)
- Mike Gerber: National Weather Service
- Natnael Habtesion: Lumen
- Michael Hayes: Texas 9-1-1 Alliance
- Jeremy Hill: NTIA
- Karima Holmes: CISA
- Mike Hooker: T-Mobile USA

- George Kelemen: (iCERT)
- Lisa Madden: Motorola Solutions
- Christian Militeau: Bandwidth
- Leah Missildine: NASNA
- Peter Musgrove: AT&T
- Jared Owen: NTCA
- Chintan Patel: Verizon
- Tim Schram: NARUC
- Sean Scott: SecuLore
- Christiaan Segura: CTIA
- Dave Sehnert: RapidSOS
- John Snapp: Intrado
- Kelly Springer: ATIS
- Ashley Strickland: Tipton County Emergency Communications District
- Brian Tegtmeyer: U.S. Department of Transportation
- Fabricio Velez: INdigital
- Steve Watkins: Cox Communications
- Christy Williams: NCT911





## Working Group 2 : Alternates\*

- Waqas Ahmed, *CISA*
- Terri Brooks, *T-Mobile*
- John Chiaramonte, *ICERT*
- Kate Elkins, *NHTSA*
- April Heinze, *NENA*
- Ryan Jensen, *ATIS*
- Lalit Kotecha, *Verizon*
- James B Ramsay, *NARUC*
- Praveen Srivastava, *Charter Communications*

\* Alternates are not a member of the Working Group and may not vote.



# Work Status

- Work is proceeding at a good clip
- Entire report 1 and 2 outlined
- 5-10% of report 1 is already drafted
- Contributions in progress for ~30% of the full report
- The group meets weekly; meetings are energetic and effective
- Meetings paused through December to accommodate holidays



# Report 1 Content (Heading level 1 only)

- Technical Background
- Backup Networks Available for 9-1-1
- Prioritization of Backup network Options
- 9-1-1 Alternate Access Scenarios
- Intelligent Network Selection
- Limitations in use of Backup Networks
- Callbacks
- Class of Service and Method Tokens
- Information Delivered to PSAPs

\* ~50 subheadings not shown here



# Next Steps

- Review current outstanding contributions to text
- Continue drafting document sections assigned to authors
- Build on work from CSRIC VIII report on WiFi for 9-1-1
- Invite experts to consult on new technologies and backup access methods
- Workgroup generally has sufficient expertise to complete the work, but some ultra-specialist input is needed from private sector partners





# **Working Group #3 : Preparing for 6G Security and Reliability**

December 18, 2024

Co-Chairs: Brian Daly (AT&T), George Woodward (Rural Wireless Association, Inc.)

FCC Liaison: Jeffrey Goldthorp

# Working Group #3 Charter & Tasks Review

- The Chairwoman of the FCC directs CSRIC IX to examine and address security and reliability risks unique to emerging 6G networks and services.
- CSRIC IX will develop a plan for the development and deployment of reliable and security 6G networks and services that minimize privacy risks.
- 6G networks are at least seven years from commercial deployment, but wireless technology moves at such a brisk pace that the Commission is compelled to seek early recommendations from stakeholders that will lead to more secure and reliable 6G networks and services.
- 6G is expected to result in orders of magnitude improvements in network speed and latency, enabling capabilities that cause distinctions between the physical and cyber worlds to fade.
- CSRIC IX will make an early foray into examining and addressing potential security and reliability risks in emerging 6G networks and service.



Milestone: Report on Potential Security and Reliability Risks in 6G and Recommendations for Mitigation, December 2025

# Working Group #3: Members

<b>Alexandra Blasgen</b>	Consumer Technology Association	<b>Co-Chairs:</b>	
<b>Leonid Burakovsky</b>	Palo Alto Networks	<b>Brian Daly</b>	AT&T
<b>Afeite Dadja</b>	CTIA	<b>George Woodward</b>	Rural Wireless Association, Inc.
<b>Robert Dew</b>	Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security Agency		
<b>Paul Eisler</b>	USTelecom – The Broadband Association	<b>Jeffrey Goldthorp</b>	FCC Liaison
<b>Robert Gazda</b>	InterDigital		
<b>Puneet Jain</b>	Intel		
<b>Anu Jagannath</b>	ANDRO Computational Solutions, LLC		
<b>Virendra Kumar</b>	Qualcomm		
<b>Michael Lijenstram</b>	Ericsson		
<b>Jason Livingood</b>	Comcast		
<b>Martin McGrath</b>	Nokia		
<b>Susan Miller</b>	ATIS		
<b>Douglas Montgomery</b>	NIST		
<b>Harish Negalaguli</b>	Motorola Solutions		
<b>Anthony Petrovich</b>	Mavenir Systems, Inc.		
<b>Abir Ray</b>	Expression Networks LLC		
<b>Michael Regan</b>	Telecommunications Industry Association		
<b>Travis Russell</b>	Oracle Communications		
<b>Yousif Targali</b>	Verizon		
<b>Peter Thermos</b>	Palindrome Technologies		
<b>Jean C. Trakinat</b>	T-Mobile USA		
<b>Douglas Varney</b>	USCellular		



# Working Group #3: Alternates\*

Anmol Agarwal, *Nokia*

Colin Andrews, *TIA*

J. David Grossman, *CTA*

Taylor Hartley, *Ericsson*

Abhijeet Kolekar, *Intel Corporation*

Andrezj Osinski, *CISA*

Justin Perkins, *CTIA*

Michael Salmon, *Verizon*

Gregory Schumacher, *ATIS*

Kathleen S Thompson, *USTelecom*

\* Alternates are not a member of the Working Group and may not vote.





# Working Group #3 Status


- Bi-weekly virtual meetings are being held
- Subject Matter Experts invited for presentation to the working group:
  - 6G Threat Analysis
  - Considerations of the threat vectors in 6G and mitigations such as zero trust
  - 6G Sensing and Security
- Draft outline developed for the working group deliverable

# Draft Outline - Potential Security and Reliability Risks in 6G and Recommendations for Mitigation

- Section 1- Understand 6G Timelines, Use Cases, Architecture and Features
- Section 2 - Define the 6G Threat Landscape- Identify Potential Threats
- Section 3. Analyze Threats
- Section 4 - Identify Vulnerabilities
- Section 5 - Evaluate Impact and Likelihood
- Section 6 - Evaluate Existing Controls
- Section 7 - Develop Mitigation Strategies
- Section 8 - Continuous Monitoring and Updating
- Section 9 – Reliability and Resiliency
- Section 10 - Collaboration and Standardization
- Section 11. Advisements and Recommendations

# Understand 6G Timelines, Use Cases, Architecture and Features


## ITU-R Timeline and Process



Note 1: WP SD #59 will additionally organize a workshop involving the Proponents and registered Independent Evaluation Groups (IEGs) to support the evaluation process  
 Note 2: While not expected to change, details may be adjusted if warranted. Content of deliverables to be defined by responsible WP SD groups



## Capabilities of IMT-2030



## 6 Usage scenarios

Extension from IMT-2020 (5G)


- eMBB → Immersive Communication
- mMTC → Massive Communication
- URLLC → HURLLC (Hyper Reliable & Low-Latency Communication)

New

- Ubiquitous Connectivity
- AI and Communication
- Integrated Sensing and Communication



4 Overarching aspects:

act as design principles commonly applicable to all usage scenarios  
 Sustainability, Connecting the unconnected,  
 Ubiquitous intelligence, Security/resilience



# Understand 6G Timelines, Use Cases, Architecture and Features

- Rel-20 SA1 6G study has started
- Rel-20 content to be decided in 1H2025
- Release 20 content defined in two steps with 5G Advanced and 6G work staggered and decisions made separately
- 3GPP workshop on 6G to be held in March 2025
  - Vision & Priorities for the Next Generation
  - RAN, System Architecture, Core Network & Protocols
- Rel-21 will have the specification work on 6G and the TSG RAN IMT-2030 submission



# Understand 6G Timelines, Use Cases, Architecture and Features

- Very Early Insights into the 3GPP SA1 Study related to the WG charter:
  - **Network Security for 6G**
    - It is expected that cellular networks become “more secure” with each subsequent generation
    - Networks are becoming more complex, with 6G also seeming to be a convergence of disparate technologies (e.g., information, operation, communication), complicating the ecosystem with their differences in approaches, threats, disciplines, and capabilities
    - The mobile communication ecosystem needs to enhance security and privacy, embracing new security paradigms, techniques, and leveraging evolving security technologies
    - It is expected that cloud deployments will play an even more important role in 6G
    - 6G network must provide trust and security mechanisms for secure access to and communication with network elements
  - **Quantum-resistant security**
    - Quantum computing technology poses significant threats to some classical cryptography
    - 6G system should provide security protection for communication against the potential attacks posed by quantum computing



# Understand 6G Timelines, Use Cases, Architecture and Features

- **Very Early** Insights into the 3GPP SA1 Study related to the WG charter:
  - **False Base Station Attack Mitigation**
    - False Base Station (FBS) attacks and its potential to cause active and passive impacts are an alarming concern worldwide
    - Increasing the level of security between the radio network entities and the UE during the initial network selection procedure, may be possible to prevent false Base Station at earlier stages of communication establishment
    - Subject to operator policy and regulatory requirements, the 6G system should support a means for a UE to be able to distinguish a false base station from an authentic base station
  - **Resilient positioning in satellite networks**
    - Dependency on GNSS results in major threats and risks, in case of unavailability or disruption of GNSS (jamming, spoofing or obstructions)
    - 6G system with satellite access may provide positioning service with 3GPP technologies, independently of non-3GPP positioning technologies (e.g. GNSS)

# Understand 6G Timelines, Use Cases, Architecture and Features

- **Very Early** Insights into the 3GPP SA1 Study related to the WG charter:
  - **Disaster Relief**
    - Resiliency when the terrestrial network is down, and “terrestrial” mobile service is not available in the area
    - Look for alternative available network(s) in the area, such as satellite access and HAPS based access networks
    - Public warning service (i.e., Wireless Emergency Alerts) to the impacted area
  - **AI**
    - APIs to allow authorized third parties to retrieve availability information about computational resources
    - Monitoring and reporting of computational resource usage in the operator managed data network
  - **Other possible use cases with security implications:**
    - Immersive Communication
    - Integrated Sensing and Communication
    - Low-altitude UAV supervision



# Deliverables/Schedule

- Virtual meetings scheduled on a bi-weekly basis.
  - Subject matter expert presentations on specific topics or research areas are scheduled
  - ATIS workspace set up for document management and collaboration
- 2-day face-to-face meeting (with virtual option) scheduled in January (Alpharetta, GA)
- **Deliverable**: Report on Potential Security and Reliability Risks in 6G and Recommendations for Mitigation.
- **Deliverable Schedule**: December 2025





**Thank you!**

